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Not Just Later, but Fewer: Novel Trends in Cohort Fertility  
in the Nor dic Countries
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ABSTRACT With his tor i cally sim i lar pat terns of high and sta ble cohort fer til ity and high 
lev els of gen der equal ity, the Nor dic countries of Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, 
and Iceland are seen as fore run ners in demo graphic behav ior. Furthermore, Nor dic 
fer­til­ity­trends­have­strongly­influ­enced­fer­til­ity­the­o­ries.­However,­the­period­fer­til­ity­
decline that started around 2010 in many countries with rel a tively high fer til ity is par­
tic u larly pro nounced in the Nor dic countries, rais ing the ques tion of whether Nor dic 
cohort fer til ity will also decline and devi ate from its his tor i cally sta ble pat tern. Using 
har mo nized data across the Nor dic countries, we com pre hen sively describe this period 
decline and ana lyze the extent to which it is attrib ut able to tempo or quan tum effects. 
Two­key­results­stand­out.­First,­the­decline­is­mostly­attrib­ut­able­to­first­births­but­can­
be observed across all ages from 15 to the mid­30s. This is a rever sal from the pre vi­
ous trend in which fer til ity rates in the early 30s increased rel a tively steadily in those 
countries in the period 1980–2010. Second, tempo explains only part of the decline. 
Forecasts indi cate that the aver age Nor dic cohort fer til ity will decline from 2 chil dren 
for the 1970 cohort to around 1.8 chil dren for the late 1980s cohorts. Finland diverges 
from the other countries in terms of its lower expected cohort fer til ity (below 1.6), and 
Denmark and Sweden diverge from Finland, Iceland, and Norway in terms of their 
slower­cohort­fer­til­ity­decline.­These­find­ings­sug­gest­that­the­con­cep­tu­al­i­za­tion­of­the­
Nor dic model of high and sta ble fer til ity may need to be revised.
KEYWORDS Nor dic fer til ity regime • Period fer til ity • Cohort fer til ity • Fertility 
tim ing • Forecasting
Introduction
Compared with other high­income countries, the Nor dic countries of Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland com bine rel a tively high fer til ity lev els with high 
female labor mar ket par tic i pa tion rates. The Nor dic countries’ rel a tively high fer til ity 
regime is often attrib uted to pub lic pol i cies that lower the oppor tu nity costs of fam­
ily for ma tion and pro mote work­fam ily rec on cil i a tion and gen der equal ity (Andersson 
2004; Andersson et al. 2009; Neyer et al. 2006). The Nor dic countries are often seen 
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as fore run ners in fer til ity behav ior. Several recent fer til ity the o ries are based on the 
empir i cal asso ci a tions between gen der equal ity and fer til ity observed in Nor dic coun­
tries (Duvander et al. 2019). For exam ple, at later phases in the demo graphic tran si­
tion, improve ments in gen der equal ity may pre vent fer til ity from fall ing to very low 
lev els (Esping­Andersen 2009; McDonald 2000, 2013). Furthermore, some the o ries 
have­pos­tu­lated­spe­cifi­­cally­that­increases­in­fer­til­ity­are­con­di­tional­on­men­becom­ing­
more involved in fam ily life to ease the dou ble bur den of bal anc ing work and fam ily 
that women tend to carry (Anderson and Kohler 2015; Esping­Andersen and Billari 
2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). Thus, under stand ing fer til ity in the Nor dic countries 
can con trib ute to an under stand ing of fer til ity trends in countries beyond the region.
However,­the­Nor­dic­countries­have­expe­ri­enced­a­sustained­decline­in­their­period­
fer til ity rates since 2010 (Comolli et al. 2020;­Hellstrand­et­al.­2020). Although the 
decrease in period fer til ity was also observed in other countries tending to have rel a­
tively high fer til ity (e.g., France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States), 
trends­in­Nor­dic­countries­stand­out­(Human­Fertility­Database­2019). In 2018, the 
total fer til ity rate (TFR) reached 1.41 in Finland and 1.56 in Norway: these are the 
low est lev els across the Nor dic countries and are lower than the 2017 Euro pean aver­
age TFR of 1.58 (Figure 1). The eco nomic cri sis of 2008 has been con sid ered a poten­
tial can di date for the recent fer til ity decline, but evi dence sug gests that fer til ity lev els 
have not been declin ing coher ently with the sever ity or dura tion of the eco nomic 
cri sis (Comolli et al. 2020), which makes the Nor dic fer til ity decline espe cially puz­
zling. The declines in period fer til ity sug gest that the com mon high Nor dic fer til ity 
regime may be chang ing. More broadly, these trends chal lenge the idea that high gen­
der equal ity hin ders fer til ity declines.
Whether the strong decline in period fer til ity in the Nor dic countries will affect 
the total num ber of chil dren that women cur rently of child bear ing age will ulti­
mately have is not yet known. Period­based mea sures are sen si tive to the tim ing of 
child bear ing (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998) and tend to under es ti mate the com pleted 
fer til ity of cohorts when women post pone child bear ing (Myrskylä et al. 2013). Most 
of the pre vi ously observed var i a tion in period fer til ity in the Nor dic countries has 
been attrib uted to tempo effects, given that the com pleted cohort fer til ity level has 
been nearly con stant and close to replace ment level for cohorts born since the 1940s 
(Andersson et al. 2009; Jalovaara et al. 2019). A key exam ple of a tempo effect is the 
so-called­roller-coaster­fer­til­ity­that­Sweden­expe­ri­enced­in­the­1990s­(Hoem­2005), 
when the TFR fell from its peak level of 2.14 in 1990 to an all ­time low of 1.51 in 
1999. This short­term trend had no impli ca tions for cohort fer til ity.
Further, existing cohort fer til ity fore casts for the Nor dic and other high­income 
countries are becom ing out dated; they do not cover the last decade (Myrskylä et al. 
2013; Schmertmann et al. 2014). These fore casts were pro duced in a period when 
age 30+ fer til ity was increas ing and youn ger age fer til ity was sta ble or decreas ing 
only slightly, which pro duced sta ble or even increas ing cohort fer til ity up to the late 
1970s­cohort.­For­Finland,­the­find­ings­of­Hellstrand­et­al.­(2020) sug gest that the 
decline­in­period­fer­til­ity­will­be­reflected­in­cohort­fer­til­ity:­the­com­pleted­fer­til­ity­
of women born in the late 1980s could fall below 1.7. A com pa ra ble anal y sis—or an 
anal y sis that attempts to dis tin guish the tempo from the quan tum con tri bu tions to the 
recent decline in fer til ity—has not yet been conducted for the other Nor dic countries. 
Therefore, it remains unknown whether the recent decline in period fer til ity across 
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the­Nor­dic­countries­merely­reflects­fer­til­ity­post­pone­ment,­or­whether­the­cohort­fer-
til ity lev els in these countries are under go ing long­term changes.
A cohort fer til ity decline in the Nor dic countries would indi cate that the con cept 
of a com mon Nor dic regime char ac ter ized by high and sta ble cohort fer til ity, which 
is based on cur rent fer til ity lev els, may need to be revisited. Furthermore, although 
Nor dic countries are often con sid ered prime exam ples of countries with macro­level 
asso ci a tions between high gen der equal ity lev els and fer til ity increases (Myrskylä 
et al. 2011; Myrskylä et al. 2012),­ the­find­ing­ that­cohort­ fer­til­ity­ is­decreas­ing­ in­
these­countries­would­con­test­ this­assump­tion.­Micro-level­find­ings­for­ the­Nor­dic­
countries have already pointed out that the rela tion ship between gen der equal ity and 
fer til ity is ambig u ous. The avail abil ity of long paren tal leave schemes may hin der 
devel op ments in gen der equal ity by dis cour ag ing moth ers’ employ ment (Rønsen and 
Sundström 2002): higher fer til ity is con cen trated among moth ers who make exten­
sive use of long fam ily leaves (Duvander et al. 2010; Erlandsson 2017).
In­this­study,­we­ana­lyze­recent­fer­til­ity­trends­in­the­five­Nor­dic­countries­using­
the lat est avail able data. Using demo graphic decom po si tions, tempo adjust ments, and 
inno va tive cohort fore cast ing meth ods, we doc u ment the con tri bu tions of age and 
par ity to the decline in TFR in 2010–2018, esti mate the mag ni tude of the decrease in 
period fer til ity with out tempo dis tor tions, and fore cast com pleted fer til ity for women 


















Fig. 1 Total fertility rate (TFR) in the Nordic countries and average TFR among European countries in 1970–
2018. European countries include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France,­Greece,­Hungary,­Iceland,­Ireland,­Italy,­Lithuania,­Luxembourg,­the­Netherlands,­Norway,­Poland,­
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Sources: 
Eurostat­(2019),­Nordic­Statistical­Bureaus­(2020),­and­the­Human­Fertility­Database­(2020).
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tum and, if so, how the mag ni tude of this decline dif fers across these countries. The 
key­strengths­of­our­study­are­the­com­par­i­son­of­five­countries­simul­ta­neously­under-
go ing a fer til ity tran si tion; the use of har mo nized, high­qual ity, up­to­date data for 
each coun try; and the appli ca tion of sev eral meth ods that inde pen dently exam ine the 
recent period fer til ity decline from dif fer ent angles and under dif fer ent assump tions.
The Common Nor dic Fertility Regime
The Nor dic countries’ child bear ing trends and fam ily pol i cies share many char ac ter­
is tics and have his tor i cally conformed to the established idea of a com mon Nor dic 
fer til ity regime (Andersson et al. 2009)—that is, rel a tively high and sta ble cohort fer­
til ity underpinned by high lev els of sup port for work ing moth ers. Finland can be seen 
as a slight out lier, where ulti mate child less ness has his tor i cally been con sid er ably 
more­com­mon­than­in­the­other­Nor­dic­countries­(Hellstrand­et­al.­2020; Kreyenfeld 
and Konietzka 2017). Iceland has also his tor i cally displayed a dis tinct pat tern, with 
higher­fer­til­ity.­However,­it­is­gen­er­ally­agreed­that­Nor­dic­countries­pro­vide­a­favor-
able set ting for com bin ing work and fam ily life, which has resulted in high labor 
force par tic i pa tion rates for women and high rates of enroll ment in childcare. Thus, 
these countries are often con sid ered van guards of fam ily demo graphic devel op ments 
in the Western world.
Although most high­income countries have expe ri enced a decline in cohort fer­
til ity starting with the 1940s birth cohorts, cohort fer til ity sta bi lized in the Nor dic 
countries at around replace ment level among the cohorts born in the 1940s or later 
(Frejka 2017; Zeman et al. 2018). Consequently, the long­term impli ca tions of very 
low fer til ity that many Euro pean countries have been fac ing (Mor gan 2003) have not 
pre vi ously been press ing pol icy con cerns in the Nor dic region. A weak down ward 
trend started with the 1960s cohorts because of decreas ing pro gres sion to third and 
higher­order births rather than increas ing child less ness (Zeman et al. 2018). Cohort 
fer til ity for women born in the early 1970s is 1.9 in Finland, 2.0 in Denmark and 
Sweden,­2.1­in­Norway,­and­2.3­in­Iceland­(Human­Fertility­Database­2019). Few 
high­income countries, includ ing the United States and Northern Ireland, also have 
cohort fer til ity above replace ment level. In con trast, cohort fer til ity has dropped 
below the 1.5 level in some Southern Euro pean and East Asian countries for the 
cohorts born in the 1970s (Frejka 2017).
Regarding par ity dis tri bu tions in the Nor dic countries, a strong uni for mity is char­
ac­ter­is­tic­of­the­first­and­sec­ond­births,­whereas­dif­fer­ences­in­child­less­ness­and­third­
and fourth births indi cate some cross­coun try diver sity also in the Nor dic model. 
Childlessness lev els are gen er ally around the Euro pean aver age (Sobotka 2017a), and 
the two­child norm is strong in these countries (Duvander et al. 2019; Frejka 2008). 
In all Nor dic countries, ulti mate child less ness rose slightly starting with the 1950s 
cohorts but plateaued for the 1960s–1970s cohorts at a level rang ing from 12% in 
Norway to 15% in Sweden (Andersson et al. 2009; Jalovaara et al. 2019). In Finland, 
ulti mate child less ness is above 20% for the cohorts born in the early 1970s, which 
is among the highest shares glob ally (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2017).­However,­
Finland makes up for its high pro por tion child less through the large pro por tion of 
its pop u la tion with mul ti ple chil dren. For exam ple, about 10% of all recent births 
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in Finland were of fourth or higher birth order, which is the highest share across all 
EU mem ber states and twice as high as the share in other Nor dic countries (Eurostat 
2019a). Consequently, the share of women with two chil dren is lower in Finland 
(about 36% in the mid­1970s cohort) than in the other Nor dic countries (around 
42%­to­45%­in­Denmark,­Norway,­and­Sweden)­(Human­Fertility­Database­2019). 
Iceland also stands out with a high pro por tion of third births: the share of recent 
births of third birth order is close to 20%, com pared with around 15% in other Nor dic 
countries (Eurostat 2019a). Compared with other high­income countries, the Nor dic 
region­ranks­highest­in­the­pro­gres­sion­from­first­to­sec­ond­births;­in­third­and­higher­
birth pro gres sion, Nor dic countries place only slightly below the top­rank ing lev els 
observed in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia (Zeman et al. 2018).
In high­income countries, fer til ity post pone ment has been one of the main demo­
graphic trends in recent decades (Mills et al. 2011; Nathan and Pardo 2019; Sobotka 
2017b). One of the most strik ing demo graphic devel op ments in the Nor dic countries 
has been the strong fer til ity recu per a tion at older ages, which has counterbalanced 
post pone ment (Andersson et al. 2009;­Lesthaeghe­2010). Whereas the wide spread 
post pone ment of fer til ity observed in most high­income countries has been linked 
to ris ing edu ca tional enroll ment and career build ing (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 
2012), fer til ity recu per a tion has been char ac ter ized as a con se quence of wel fare pro­
vi sions that sup port dual­earner fam i lies with young chil dren (Kravdal and Rindfuss 
2008;­Lesthaeghe­2010). Indeed, the Nor dic countries are known to have the highest 
lev els of gen der equal ity in the world and to pro mote work­fam ily rec on cil i a tion 
among cou ples by offer ing some of the world’s most pro gres sive fam ily pol i cies 
(Neyer et al. 2006; Rindfuss et al. 2016). Building on the ideas of McDonald (2000, 
2013), recent the o ries pre dict a return to higher fer til ity after gen der equal ity in the 
fam ily catches up with gen der equal ity in other spheres of soci ety, such as in the edu­
ca tional sys tem and the labor mar ket (Anderson and Kohler 2015; Esping­Andersen 
and Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015).­Macro-level­ find­ings­ imply­ that­ gen-
der rev o lu tion in terms of men becom ing more involved in fam ily life has hin dered 
strong declines in cohort fer til ity but has not increased it (Frejka et al. 2018).
Policy Goals and Fertility in Nor dic Countries
Given the gen eral assump tion that the Nor dic countries’ fam ily pol i cies have helped 
to cre ate a favor able set ting for rel a tively high fer til ity (Adserà 2004; Brewster and 
Rindfuss 2000), we pro vide a brief over view of the Nor dic pol icy goals and their 
implementation. Social and gen der equal ity is an explicit pol icy goal of the social 
dem o cratic Nor dic wel fare states (Esping­Andersen 1990), with high labor mar ket 
par tic i pa tion for both men and women as an under ly ing pre con di tion for maintaining 
the Nor dic model. These countries pro mote a dual earner–dual care giver model in 
which men and women are expected to par tic i pate equally in both paid work and 
child­rearing­ (Ellingsæter­ and­ Leira­ 2006; Gornick and Meyers 2009).­ However,­
although Nor dic countries are the most gen der­equal countries glob ally (World Bank 
2012), their pol icy goals of obtaining gen der equal ity are not fully achieved in prac­
tice.­High­over­all­Nor­dic­female­employ­ment­rates­are­accom­pa­nied­by­high­rates­
of part­time work among women and occu pa tional seg re ga tion: women are more 
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likely than men to work in the pub lic sec tor but are less likely to hold high posi­
tions (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). The share of women’s total employ ment that is 
part­time work is close to or slightly above the 2018 EU aver age of 31% in Norway, 
Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden, but it is much lower in Finland (at 19%) (Eurostat 
2019b). Additionally, Nor dic men per form less unpaid work than their female coun­
ter parts, even though they share domes tic respon si bil i ties more equally than men in 
most­other­countries­(Hook­2006; Prince Cooke and Baxter 2010).
The Nor dic fam ily pol i cies are in line with gen eral pol icy goals designed to pro­
mote gen der equal ity rather than to pro mote child bear ing per se (Rønsen 2004). For 
instance, a non trans fer able earmarked part of paid paren tal leave that com pen sates 
for income loss after child birth is reserved for each par ent, and access to afford able 
daycare for young chil dren is guaranteed, regard less of the par ents’ labor mar ket 
sta tus. As an alter na tive to daycare, par ents in Norway and Finland can choose the 
option to care for chil dren at home after the paid leave ends and receive a cash­for­
care com pen sa tion until the child turns age 2 in Norway and home care allow ance 
until the child turns age 3 in Finland. The actual uptake of paid leave by fathers 
tends to be higher when a larger part of this leave is earmarked for the father. The 
only excep tion to this pat tern is Finland, where fathers’ uptake of paren tal leave is as 
low as it is in Denmark (11% in 2016), even though Denmark has not had any quota 
reserved for fathers since the short quota in 1997–2002 (Grødem 2014; Nor dic Social 
Statistical Committee 2017). In Norway, Sweden, and Iceland, the uptake of paren tal 
leave by fathers varies between 20% and 30%.
Although all Nor dic countries sup port the dual earner–dual care giver model, some 
var i a tion exists. Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark are grouped in the one-year leave, 
gen der equal ity–ori ented model,­with­a­well-paid­paren­tal­leave­for­most­of­the­first­
year fol low ing child birth that can be shared among par ents. Norway and Finland have 
a paren tal choice–ori ented model with very long leave peri ods due to the addi tional 
avail abil ity of the low­paid home care arrange ments (Wall and Escobedo 2013). Fur­
ther, Denmark dif fers from Sweden and Iceland in its lower sup port for car ing fathers 
(no father’s quota), and Finland stands out with rel a tively low childcare enroll ment 
and uptake of paren tal leave by fathers (Grødem 2014). Daycare cov er age for 1­ to 
2­year­olds has dur ing the last decades been steadily increas ing to lev els cur rently at 
70% to 90% in other Nor dic countries; in Finland, the increase has been slow, and the 
level remains below 50% (Nor dic Social Statistical Committee 2017).
The last decade has seen no major shifts or cut backs in fam ily pol i cies; rather, 
the pol icy envi ron ment has been rel a tively sta ble, with gen er ally minor and grad ual 
adjust ments, mainly concerning changes in the father’s quota. In Finland, the father’s 
quota­was­first­ intro­duced­in­2013,­one­to­two­decades­later­than­the­other­Nor­dic­
countries, and an attempt to lengthen this nine­week quota was abolished in 2018 
(Eerola et al. 2019; Rostgaard 2014). In Sweden, the father’s quota was increased 
from 8 to 12 weeks in 2016 (Duvander et al. 2019). The length of the father’s quota 
has been expanded and reduced sev eral times in Norway: from 10 to 12 weeks in 
2011, from 12 to 14 weeks in 2013, from 14 to 10 weeks in 2014, and from 10 to 15 
weeks­in­2018.­The­aim­of­the­reduc­tion­in­2014­was­to­ensure­fam­i­lies’­flex­i­bil­ity­
and free dom of choice, but it also resulted in a decreased uptake of leave by fathers 
(Ruud 2015). In Iceland, the income com pen sa tion for paren tal leave was reduced in 
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the after math of the eco nomic reces sion in 2009, resulting in a lower leave uptake by 
fathers (Duvander et al. 2019; Sigurdardottir and Garðarsdóttir 2018).
The home care allow ance scheme is impor tant in Finland (Erlandsson 2017), and 
most­moth­ers­make­some­use­of­this­pay­ment­(Haataja­and­Juutilainen­2014). Sev­
eral­attempts­to­shorten­the­pay­ment­in­Finland­have­been­unsuc­cess­ful­(Heinonen­
and Saarikallio­Torp 2018;­Salmi­and­Lammi-Taskula­2013). In Norway, the length 
of the cash­for­care pay ment was reduced by one year in 2012 and now cov ers only 
children younger than 2 years (Grødem 2014). The uptake of cash­for­care pay ment 
has been steadily declin ing in Norway, although it increased slightly due to the sig­
nifi­­cant­increase­in­the­amount­of­pay­ment­for­1-year-olds­in­2014­(Duvander­and­
Ellingsæter 2016). In Sweden, munic i pal i ties could pre vi ously choose to pay a child­
care con tri bu tion for 1­ to 3­year­olds, but in 2016, this vol un tary munic i pal scheme 
was removed (Nor dic Social Statistical Committee 2017).
To sum up, Nor dic countries have been lead ing inter na tion ally in implementing 
pol i cies that aim to sup port work­fam ily bal ance among par ents (Thévenon 2011). 
Furthermore, stud ies have con sis tently high lighted the pos i tive impact of pol i cies 
supporting work­fam ily rec on cil i a tion and fathers’ par tic i pa tion in domes tic work on 
fer­til­ity­in­high-income­countries­(Luci-Greulich­and­Thévenon­2013; Thévenon and 
Gauthier 2011).­However,­the­sub­stan­tial­decline­in­period­fer­til­ity­that­has­recently­
occurred in the Nor dic countries despite their exem plary fam ily and social pol i cies 
calls into ques tion whether these countries can still be seen as illus tra tive exam ples of 
the asso ci a tion between gen der equal ity and fer til ity. Thus, more insight into fer til ity 
decline and its under ly ing rea sons is needed.
Data and Methods
Data
We base our ana ly ses on a com bi na tion of aggre gated data obtained directly from 
national­sta­tis­ti­cal­agencies­as­well­as­data­from­the­Human­Fertility­Database­(HFD),­
a source of high­qual ity fer til ity data based on a col lab o ra tion between the Max 
Planck Institute for Demographic Research and the Vienna Institute of Demography 
(Human­Fertility­Database­2019).­From­the­HFD,­we­use­sev­eral­types­of­age-­and­
birth­order–spe­cific­fer­til­ity­rates.­First,­we­use­inci­dence­rates­that­relate­births­of­
women in a cer tain age group/cohort to all women in that age group/cohort, regard­
less of par ity. Second, we use two types of con di tional rates: births of (1) order i 
related to women of par ity i – 1, and (2) order i related to all women who have not yet 
reached par ity i. The age of the mother was recorded as the age at (1) the time of birth 
for the period­based rates and (2) the end of the year for the cohort­based rates. Data 
for all Nor dic countries for the most recent years1­are­not­yet­avail­able­in­the­HFD,­
but the respec tive national sta tis ti cal agencies sup plied them to us. We used these data 
1 As of August 19, 2020, all types of fer til ity rates (as described ear lier) in 2017–2018 for Denmark and 
con di tional rates and the female par ity dis tri bu tion in 2016–2018 for Norway and 2009–2018 for Iceland 
were­miss­ing­from­the­HFD.
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to­cal­cu­late­fer­til­ity­rates­to­match­the­for­mat­in­the­HFD.2 Thus, we have com plete 
time series of rates from 1970 to 2018 for all countries. For Iceland, we have rates 
that relate births of order i to women of par ity i – 1 since 2009.
Methods
We­describe­trends­in­fer­til­ity­rates­by­five-year­age­groups­using­inci­dence­rates.­We­
use the step wise replace ment method (Andreev and Shkolnikov 2012; Andreev et al. 
2002) and con di tional fer til ity rates (births of order i related to women of par ity i – 1) 
to decom pose the dif fer ence in the TFR com puted from con di tional age­ and par ity­
spe­cific­fer­til­ity­rates­(𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑝) in 2010 and 2018. Because the 𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑝 adjusts for both the 
age and the par ity com po si tion of the female pop u la tion, it might dif fer slightly from 
the­con­ven­tional­TFR.­However,­the­𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑝 allows us to decom pose the recent period 
fer til ity devel op ment into addi tive age and par ity con tri bu tions.
Changes in the tim ing of child bear ing are known to impact TFR. We apply the 
tempo­ and par ity­adjusted TFR (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012), denoted as TFR(BS), 
to mea sure the distorting impact of changes in fer til ity tim ing on the TFR. The 
TFR(BS) is an improve ment over the sim ple tempo­adjusted TFR (Bongaarts and 
Feeney 1998), denoted as TFR(BF), because it con trols for the female par ity dis tri­
bu­tion­and­removes­the­addi­tional­distorting­par­ity­com­po­si­tion­effect­that­influ­ences­
the con ven tional TFR (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012). The TFR(BS) exhib its smaller 
year-to-year­fluc­tu­a­tions­and­is­a­closer­approx­i­ma­tion­of­com­pleted­cohort­fer­til­ity­
(Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012).­However,­whereas­ the­TFR(BF)­can­be­cal­cu­lated­
using inci dence rates only, the TFR(BS) requires infor ma tion on the female pop u la­
tion by par ity and is cal cu lated using con di tional rates on births of order i related to 
all women who have not yet reached par ity i. We there fore apply the TFR(BF) when 
we lack data on the female par ity dis tri bu tion, as we do for Iceland before 2009.
In addi tion, we apply existing para met ric and model­based approaches (Myrskylä 
et al. 2013; Schmertmann et al. 2014)­and­a­new­non­para­met­ric­approach­(Hellstrand­
et al. 2020) to esti mate the cohort fer til ity rates (CFRs) for women cur rently aged 30 
and­older.­For­cohort­fer­til­ity­esti­ma­tion,­we­use­the­age-spe­cific­inci­dence­rates­that­
relate births to women in a cer tain cohort to all women in that cohort. The fore casts 
esti mate the ulti mate total num ber of chil dren for women still of repro duc tive age. 
Using­the­sim­ple­freeze­rate­method,­which­freezes­the­lat­est­observed­age-spe­cific­
fer til ity rates into the future, we esti mate what the cohort fer til ity would be if the 
age-spe­cific­rates­do­not­change­over­the­com­ing­years.­The­five-year­extrap­o­la­tion­
method (Myrskylä et al. 2013)­extrap­o­lates­ the­ trend­from­the­past­five­years­ into­
the future and then freezes the rates. The extrap o la tion of trends per forms well when 
older age fer til ity devel ops con tin u ously, with out inter rup tion, over a period of time. 
If­the­trends­change,­the­freeze­rate­method­may­be­pref­er­a­ble.­Using­age-spe­cific­fer-
2­ Because­of­rules­about­iden­ti­fi­able­data­for­Denmark­and­Norway,­cells­with­less­than­three­obser­va­tions­
were set to 0, and cells with three to four obser va tions were set to 5 in the tables that were used to cal cu late 
the fer til ity rates. Only live births to indi vid u als reg is tered as liv ing in Denmark when giv ing birth were 
included. Parities include pre vi ous out­of­coun try births for both expa tri ates and migrants, pro vided that 
these chil dren were resid ing in Denmark on Decem ber 31 of any year from 1985 onward.
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til­ity­rates­from­the­HFD­countries­before­1960­as­prior­data,­the­Bayes­ian­fore­cast­ing­
method (Schmertmann et al. 2014) pro duces a prob a bi lis tic fore cast that includes 
esti ma tes of uncer tainty and extrap o lates trends in fer til ity rates over both time and 
age.­The­freeze­rate­method,­ the­five-year­extrap­o­la­tion­method,­and­ the­Bayes­ian­
method are among the best­performing cohort fer til ity fore cast ing meth ods (Bohk­
Ewald et al. 2018), and all are applied in this study.
The Bayes ian fore cast ing method has strong model­based assump tions regard­
ing­trends­and­age­sched­ules.­Thus,­devel­op­ments­in­age-spe­cific­fer­til­ity­rates­that­
would lead to cohort sched ules with shapes not seen in his tor i cal data are con sid­
ered unlikely and rated as hav ing low prob a bil ity. A non para met ric method that lacks 
such­con­ser­va­tive­assump­tions­was­devel­oped­ to­address­ this­prob­lem­(Hellstrand­
et al. 2020). This approach over comes the draw backs of strict mod el ing assump tions 
and­the­sub­se­quent­nar­row­con­fi­dence­inter­vals­in­existing­para­met­ric­meth­ods.­The­
non para met ric method esti ma tes how cohort fer til ity will develop if the past recu­
per a tion paths observed in fer til ity his to ries are applied to women with incom plete 
age­sched­ules.­For­a­cohort­with­observed­age-spe­cific­fer­til­ity­rates­up­to­age­x, we 
cal cu late the uni verse of fer til ity changes for ages above x that have been observed 
in the past and then add these changes to the most recent year’s fer til ity rates. For 
the­ fer­til­ity­his­to­ries,­we­use­data­ from­all­HFD­countries­since­1975.­During­ this­
period, the gen eral pat tern was char ac ter ized by decreases in youn ger age fer til ity 
and increases in older age fer til ity. Consequently, the median fore cast of the non para­
met ric approach esti ma tes the com pleted cohort fer til ity if older age fer til ity starts to 
increase in accord with the main pat tern in his tor i cal data.
However,­the­fore­casted­cohort­fer­til­ity­for­cohorts­at­the­higher­child­bear­ing­ages­
of 35 and older depends very lit tle on the choice of fore cast ing method. First, fer til­
ity rates at ages 35 and older con trib ute lit tle to the over all cohort fer til ity. Second, 
these rates usu ally do not change sub stan tially over a short period. For cohorts aged 
30–35, the fore casted cohort fer til ity can vary greatly depending on the method used; 
thus, the uncer tainty about the fore casted cohort fer til ity is larger. Fertility rates at 
ages 30–35 con trib ute strongly to com pleted fer til ity and may change sub stan tially 
over short peri ods. By using a vari ety of dif fer ent meth ods, we esti mate a range of 
fore casts and do not rely on the assump tions of any sin gle method. For more details 
of the meth ods, see sec tion 1 of the online appen dix.
Results
Developments in Age-Specific Fertility in 1990–2018
Over­the­past­three­decades,­the­trends­in­age-spe­cific­fer­til­ity­rates­have­been­sim­i-
lar­across­the­Nor­dic­countries.­These­trends­are­illus­trated­by­five-year­age­groups­
shown in Figure 2.­Fertility­post­pone­ment­is­reflected­in­the­neg­a­tive­trend­up­to­age­
30 and in the over all pos i tive trend at older ages up to the year 2010. Teen births are 
becom ing rare, but births to moth ers over age 40 are increas ing, although these rates 
are still much lower than those for women in other age groups. Most impor tantly, 
since 2010, when the period fer til ity decline started, all Nor dic countries—albeit 
Denmark to a lesser extent—have seen a con sid er able decrease in fer til ity rates at 
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ages 20–39. We observe con ver gence in fer til ity rates for the age group 20–24 across 
the countries due to rap idly decreas ing rates for this group in Finland, Iceland, and 
Norway. For the age group 25–29, we observe the stron gest decrease in fer til ity rate 
in Finland, which stands out for hav ing low fer til ity rates in the peak child bear ing 












































Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article-pdf/58/4/1373/934238/1373hellstrand.pdf
by HELSINKI UNIV user
on 20 August 2021
1383Novel Trends in Cohort Fertility in the Nor dic Countries
cur­rent­fer­til­ity­rate­among­countries.­Overall,­these­find­ings­imply­that­the­fer­til­ity­
recu per a tion pat tern typ i cal of the Nor dic countries is weak en ing and that the pros­
pects for sta ble cohort fer til ity in the near future are diminishing.
Age and Parity Contributions to the Decrease in Period Fertility in 2010–2018
To­ana­lyze­the­changes­in­age-spe­cific­fer­til­ity­by­par­ity­pro­gres­sion,­we­decom-
pose the recent period fer til ity decline into addi tive age and par ity con tri bu tions. 
The decom po si tion of the decrease in 𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑝 between 2010 and 2018 by age and 
par ity is shown in Figure 3. The decline that is being decomposed dif fers between 
the countries: from 0.42–0.47 in Finland and Iceland to 0.15–0.19 in Sweden and 
Denmark.­The­dom­i­nant­pat­tern­in­all­countries­is­the­decreas­ing­first-birth­inten-
sity, with the stron gest decreases found in Finland and Norway. The con tri bu tion 
of­declin­ing­first­births­to­the­change­in­𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑝­is­larg­est­at­ages­below­30.­However,­
first-birth­inten­si­ties­have­also­decreased­at­ages­above­30­in­all­Nor­dic­countries­
but Iceland. Thus, we notice a new trend toward fam ily for ma tion post pone ment 
among­Nor­dic­women­in­their­early­30s.­Decreasing­first-birth­inten­si­ties­explain­
most of the total decrease in period fer til ity since 2010—that is, between 57% in 
Iceland and 91% in Denmark.
Higher-order­par­i­ties­have­con­trib­uted­only­slightly­to­the­total­fer­til­ity­decline.­
Across all countries, the con tri bu tion of sec ond births to the total fer til ity decline is 
less than 13%. Moreover, the con tri bu tions of par ity 3 and par i ties 4 and higher are 
small in all countries except Iceland, where one­quar ter of the decline is attrib ut able 
to third births and an addi tional 10% to fourth or higher­order births. Notably, Iceland 
has a higher starting level for third­order births than the rest of the Nor dic countries. 
However,­ decreases­ in­ higher-order­ births­ at­ older­ ages­play­ an­ impor­tant­ role­ in­
some of the countries: at ages 30+, sec ond and higher­order births explain nearly all 
the decline in Iceland and about 50% of the decline in Finland and Norway. When 
all par i ties are con sid ered, we see small increases in older age fer til ity in Denmark 
and Iceland (at ages close to 40, sec ond­birth inten si ties have increased some what 
in­Denmark,­ and­first-­ and­ sec­ond-birth­ inten­si­ties­have­ increased­ in­ Iceland)­but­
almost no increases in older age fer til ity in the rest of the Nor dic countries. The rapid 
decline in fecun dity after age 35 and the new trend toward post pone ment among 
women in their early 30s weak ens the pros pects for fer til ity recu per a tion in the com­
ing years in the Nor dic countries. For a com par i son of long­term trends and cur rent 
lev­els­in­age-­and­par­ity-spe­cific­trends­among­the­countries,­see­Figure­A1­in­the­
online appen dix.
Fertility Timing and Tempo Adjustments
Our main focus is deter min ing whether the large changes in fer til ity since 2010 can 
be explained by tim ing or tempo effects. To ana lyze the impact of changes in fer til ity 
tim ing on period fer til ity, we use the tempo­ and par ity­adjust ment method TFR(BS)3 
3 For Iceland, we use TFR(BF) until 2008.
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(Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012). Figures 4 and 5 show the devel op ment in fer til ity tim­
ing, period TFR, and TFR(BS) in the Nor dic countries in 1990–2018. In 2018, the 
mean­age­at­first­birth­was­around­29.5­in­Denmark,­Finland,­Norway,­and­Sweden,­
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Fig. 3 Decomposition of the decrease in the age­ and parity­adjusted TFR in the Nordic countries in 2010–
2018 by age and parity. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Nordic Statistical Bureaus (2020) and the 
Human­Fertility­Database­(2020).
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and peri ods. Since 1990, Finland has expe ri enced the slowest total increase in the age 
at­first­birth­(2.8­years),­and­Iceland­has­expe­ri­enced­the­fastest­increase­(4.4­years).­For­
the period after 2010, we observe signs of accel er ated fer til ity post pone ment mainly 
in­Norway­and­Finland.­Since­2010,­the­mean­age­at­first­birth­has­risen­by­1.5­years­
in Norway but by less than 0.5 years in Sweden. Although the devel op ment in fer til ity 
tim ing in Finland and Norway has been lag ging behind that in Sweden and Denmark, 
the­coun­try­dif­fer­ences­in­the­age­at­first­birth­have­recently­decreased­sub­stan­tially.
In the Nor dic countries, the TFR(BS) has been con sis tently more sta ble and at 
higher lev els than the con ven tional TFR; the TFR(BS) has been at around 2 in all 
countries, except Iceland, where it has been even higher. The TFR(BS) has, how ever, 
decreased­since­2010,­par­tic­u­larly­in­Finland,­Iceland,­and­Norway.­These­find­ings­
sug gest that the quan tum of fer til ity is decreas ing as well and that the accel er ated 
fer til ity post pone ment alone can not explain the period decline. TFR and tempo­ and 
par ity­adjusted rates by birth order are shown in Figure A2 in the online appen dix.
Cohort Fertility


























Fig. 4­ Mean­age­at­first­birth­ in­1990–2018­in­ the­Nordic­countries­and­in­Europe.­European­countries­
include­Austria,­Belgium,­Bulgaria,­Czech­Republic,­Denmark,­Estonia,­Finland,­France,­Greece,­Hungary,­
Iceland,­ Ireland,­ Italy,­ Lithuania,­ Luxembourg,­ the­ Netherlands,­ Norway,­ Poland,­ Portugal,­ Romania,­
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Sources: Authors’ calculations 
based­on­Eurostat­(2019),­Nordic­Statistical­Bureaus­(2020),­and­the­Human­Fertility­Database­(2020).
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til ity rates in Figure 6 and the cumu lated cohort fer til ity rates and the pro por tion of 
women child less for selected cohorts in Table 1. The ten dency of the age sched ules 







































Fig. 5 Observed TFR and tempo­ and parity­adjusted TFR, TFR(BS), in 1990–2018 in the Nordic coun­
tries. For Iceland, we use the tempo­adjusted TFR, TFR(BF), for the years up to 2008. Sources: Authors’ 
calculations­based­on­Nordic­Statistical­Bureaus­(2020)­and­the­Human­Fertility­Database­(2020).
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age 30 in recent years. In line with the pro nounced decreases documented ear lier for 
Finland, the peak in fer til ity rates for the 1988 cohort at 100 live births per 1,000 
women is much lower in Finland than it is in the other Nor dic countries, where the 
peak level is between 120 and 140 live births per 1,000 women. These results sug gest 
that catch ing up on all post poned births at older ages would lead to very odd shapes 
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from the bell­shaped curve exist (e.g., the bimodal fer til ity sched ule in the United 
States), such excep tions are often attrib uted to two pop u la tions mixing rather than to 
a pop u la tion­level pat tern of strong post pone ment and recu per a tion (Sullivan 2005).
The coun try pat terns of the cumu lated cohort fer til ity rates and the child less ness 
lev els for the cohorts still of child bear ing age are the same as those observed for 
cohorts who have com pleted child bear ing (Table 1). Finland has the low est cumu­
lated fer til ity and the highest level of child less ness, and Iceland has the highest cumu­
lated fer til ity and the low est level of child less ness at all ages above 30. The 1988 
cohort who reached age 30 in 2018 has had, on aver age, 0.86 chil dren in Finland and 
1.07 chil dren in Iceland. Of this cohort, more than 52% were still child less at age 30 
in Finland, com pared with just 42% in Iceland.
What the Future Holds: A Forecast of Cohort Fertility
Figure 7 dis plays the cohort fer til ity fore casts for Nor dic women born in 1975–1988.4 
All fore cast ing meth ods pro duce con sis tent results in terms of the direc tion of the 
fore­cast,­although­the­point­esti­ma­tes­and­the­width­of­the­con­fi­dence­inter­vals­vary­
to some extent. Our inter pre ta tion of the results does not put spe cial empha sis on 
any sin gle method, instead sum ma riz ing what the results gen er ated by these meth ods 
jointly sug gest about the future of cohort fer til ity.
Regardless­of­which­method­is­applied,­the­find­ings­indi­cate­that­cohort­fer­til­ity­
will slowly decrease or sta bi lize in Denmark and Sweden but will decline sharply 
in Finland, Iceland, and Norway. Finland is expected to con tinue to have the low­
est cohort fer til ity among the Nor dic countries, reaching lev els sub stan tially below 
4 Exact val ues are avail able in Table A1 in the online appen dix.
Table 1 Cumulated fer til ity rates and the pro por tion child less by cohort (age reached in 2018)  
and coun try
Cohort (age in 2018) Finland Iceland Norway Sweden Denmark
A. Cumulated Cohort Fertility Rate
  1970 (48) 1.88 2.28 2.06 1.99 1.97
  1975 (43) 1.90 2.20 2.01 1.94 1.95
  1980 (38) 1.70 2.01 1.83 1.79 1.77
  1985 (33) 1.25 1.51 1.37 1.31 1.27
  1986 (32) 1.13 1.35 1.24 1.19 1.15
  1987 (31) 0.98 1.18 1.08 1.04 1.02
  1988 (30) 0.86 1.07 0.94 0.90 0.87
B. Proportion Childless (%)
  1970 (48) 19.9 12.5 13.4 14.0 16.9
  1975 (43) 19.6 13.9 14.1 14.2 17.1
  1980 (38) 23.5 16.3 17.7 18.0 20.8
  1985 (33) 36.8 27.4 29.9 31.5 33.2
  1986 (32) 41.3 34.1 34.1 35.9 37.0
  1987 (31) 46.5 38.1 40.1 41.4 41.6
  1988 (30) 52.2 41.9 46.5 47.6 48.2
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1.75, which marks the thresh old between low and very low cohort fer til ity (Zeman 
et al. 2018). We observe the weakest declines in cohort fer til ity when apply ing the 
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Fig. 7 Observed completed cohort fertility rate (CFR) for the 1970–1974 cohorts and forecasted CFR for 
the 1975–1988 cohorts in the Nordic countries. The unbroken black line indicates the threshold for very 
low fertility, at 1.75. CI =­confidence­interval.­Sources:­Authors’­calculations­based­on­Nordic­Statistical­
Bureaus­(2020)­and­the­Human­Fertility­Database­(2020).
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the­95%­con­fi­dence­inter­val­for­the­youn­gest­cohort­includes­com­pleted­fer­til­ity­at­
lev els of 1.48–1.76 in Finland, 1.65–1.93 in Norway, 1.77–2.06 in Iceland, 1.73­2.01 
in Sweden, and 1.68–1.96 in Denmark.
At­ the­ other­ end­ of­ the­ meth­ods­ spec­trum­ are­ the­ five-year­ extrap­o­la­tion­ and­
Bayes ian approaches that rely on extrap o la tion of trends. These meth ods pro duce 
lower esti ma tes of cohort fer til ity than the non para met ric approach because recent 
trends have been neg a tive. The Bayes ian approach, which is accom pa nied by pre­
dic tion inter vals, also pro duces narrower inter vals than the non para met ric approach 
because­of­its­added­assump­tions­regard­ing­smooth­ness.­However,­the­over­all­qual­i-
ta tive con clu sions regard ing the trends, when derived using extrap o la tion approaches 
rather than the non para met ric approach, are very sim i lar: over all cohort fer til ity will 
decline, although not nec es sar ily in Denmark and Sweden.
The freeze rate approach assumes that the cur rent period fer til ity will per sist. This 
method pro duces fore casts that lie between those gen er ated by the non para met ric 
approach and the extrap o la tion meth ods. For the youn gest cohort, the freeze rate 
method yields com pleted fer til ity esti ma tes of 1.60 in Finland, 1.77 in Norway, 1.81 
in Denmark, 1.85 in Sweden, and 1.90 in Iceland. Although the freeze rate method has 
been crit i cized for underestimating com pleted fer til ity when fer til ity is post poned, the 
esti ma tes it pro duces may be more rea son able in the cur rent cir cum stances, in which 
the long­term increas ing trend in older age fer til ity appears to be chang ing, and we do 
not yet know whether this trend change in fer til ity at older ages is tem po rary. Accord­
ing to the freeze rate method, the Nor dic aver age com pleted fer til ity will decrease 
from 2.0 to an all ­time low of 1.8.
When we com pare the projected com pleted fer til ity trends (using the freeze rate 
approach) with the decline in TFR in 2010–2018 for the cohorts who were aged 30 in 
2010–2018—namely, women born in 1980–1988—we see that the mag ni tude of the 
cohort fer til ity decline is about one­half as strong as the observed TFR decline. The 
mag ni tude of the TFR(BS) decline in 2010–2018 is sim i lar to that of projected com­
pleted fer til ity trends, although the TFR(BS) level is gen er ally higher.
Discussion
This study ana lyzed recent fer til ity dynam ics in the Nor dic countries. Our study was 
the­first­ to­ana­lyze­the­most­recent­trends­by­age­and­par­ity­and­to­fore­cast­cohort­
fer­til­ity­for­the­Nor­dic­countries­using­up-to-date­data­from­the­Human­Fertility­Data­
base and Nor dic sta tis ti cal agencies. Using a vari ety of meth ods and approaches, we 
found strong indi ca tions that the recent decline in period fer til ity in the Nor dic coun­
tries is not fully attrib ut able to tim ing effects—that is, to the post pone ment of births. 
The fore casts show that the period decline is likely to trans late into a decline in cohort 
fer til ity and that cohort fer til ity is likely to fall to an all ­time low: from an aver age 
of 2 chil dren for the 1970s cohorts to an aver age of around 1.8 chil dren for the late 
1980s cohorts. Two trends appear to be occur ring in the Nor dic countries: (1) fer til ity 
is declin ing strongly in Iceland, Norway, and Finland; and (2) fer til ity is decreas ing 
less sharply or is even sta bi liz ing in Denmark and Sweden. In terms of cohort fer til ity 
lev els, Finland diverges from the rest of the Nor dic countries, with lev els expected to 
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fall well below the very low fer til ity thresh old. Tempo adjust ments to period fer til ity 
mea sures gen er ally pro duced results con sis tent with the fore cast esti ma tes.
Despite the long­term trend of fer til ity post pone ment, cohort fer til ity in the Nor dic 
countries pre vi ously remained sta ble because of strong fer til ity recu per a tion at older 
ages (Andersson et al. 2009;­Lesthaeghe­2010). Welfare pro vi sions and orga ni za­
tional fea tures that sup port dual­earner fam i lies with young chil dren have been 
con sid ered to pro mote such a recu per a tion pat tern (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008;­Les­
thaeghe 2010).­However,­in­addi­tion­to­observ­ing­a­long-term­neg­a­tive­trend­in­fer­til-
ity rates at ages below 30, we documented that older­age fer til ity has been declin ing 
since 2010 in all Nor dic countries. We found signs of accel er ated fer til ity post pone­
ment, par tic u larly in Iceland, Norway, and Finland. Nonetheless, changes in fer til ity 
tim ing failed to fully explain the recent period fer til ity decline. Given that fer til ity at 
around age 30 is declin ing for the cohorts born in the 1980s and older­age fer til ity 
is increas ing only slightly, it appears that fer til ity recu per a tion is weak en ing in the 
Nor dic countries, despite pro gres sive sup port for fam i lies with chil dren.
Parity-spe­cific­ana­ly­ses­showed­that­declin­ing­first-birth­inten­si­ties­explain­most­
of the recent period fer til ity decline in all Nor dic countries. First­birth inten si ties 




for ma tion. Furthermore, we observed almost no signs of fer til ity recu per a tion for 
any­ par­ity­ in­ any­ of­ the­ stud­ied­ countries.­ In­ con­trast­ to­ pre­vi­ous­ find­ings­ show-
ing that decreas ing pro gres sion to third and higher­order births has been driv ing the 
weak down ward trend in cohort fer til ity that started with the 1960 cohort (Zeman 
et al. 2018), the cur rent fore casted cohort fer til ity decline seems to be driven also by 
increas ing child less ness. Consequently, the pla teau in the level of child less ness in 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (Jalovaara et al. 2019) may be tem po rary. Declines 
in sub se quent child bear ing were observed par tic u larly in Iceland, where declin ing 
third-birth­inten­si­ties­explain­one-quar­ter­of­the­period­fer­til­ity­decline.­Less­extreme­
declines in sub se quent child bear ing were also found in Finland and Norway.
The mag ni tude of the expected cohort fer til ity decline varies between countries. 
Denmark and Sweden are on a tra jec tory of rel a tively weak declines in cohort fer til ity. 
For these two countries, there is still a rea son able pos si bil ity that the weak declines 
will be counterbalanced by increases in older­age fer til ity. Cohort fer til ity decline will 
accel er ate if the cur rent trend in older age fer til ity con tin ues, but the decline could 
level off for the late 1980s cohorts if Swed ish women cur rently in their early 30s 
catch up on post poned births fol low ing the recu per a tion pat terns of ear lier cohorts. 
However,­in­Finland,­Iceland,­and­Norway,­large­declines­in­cohort­fer­til­ity­will­be­
dif­fi­cult­to­avoid­even­if­women­cur­rently­of­child­bear­ing­age­in­these­countries­begin­
to catch up on post poned births with a higher inten sity than typ i cally observed in ear­
lier cohorts. Although the tra jec to ries of the sharp decline in cohort fer til ity in these 
three countries dif fer from the cohort fer til ity trends in Denmark and Sweden, some 
dif fer ences exist in the cohort fer til ity trend between these three countries. For the 
cohort born in 1970, the cohort fer til ity rate is 2.3 in Iceland, 2.1 in Norway, and 1.9 
in Finland. These dif fer ences have been attrib uted to the large pro por tion of women 
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with three chil dren in Iceland and the large pro por tion of child less women in Finland. 
Iceland is excep tional in that the main driver of its cohort fer til ity decline seems to 
be­decreas­ing­fam­ily­size­and,­to­a­lesser­extent,­decreas­ing­pro­gres­sion­to­first­birth.
Previous fore casts of cohort fer til ity have suggested that cohort fer til ity will remain 
sta ble or even increase in the Nor dic countries (Myrskylä et al. 2013; Schmertmann 
et al. 2014).­However,­these­fore­casts­did­not­use­data­after­2010,­and­their­fore­casts­
cov ered women born in 1966–1979 with fore cast uncer tainty grow ing for the youn­
gest women. Because our fore casts use more recent data and cover women born in 
1975–1988, there is an over lap in the fore casts only for women born in 1975–1979. 
For most countries and cohorts, our point esti ma tes for cohort fer til ity for these 
women are below the lower bound of the pre dic tion inter vals of the pre vi ous fore­
casts.­This­dif­fer­ence­reflects­the­fact­that­the­meth­ods­of­Myrskylä­et­al.­(2013) and 
Schmertmann et al. (2014) extrap o lated an increas ing trend in older age fer til ity after 
2010, when these trends actu ally began to reverse. Notably, the late 1970s cohort was 
in their early 30s when the pre vi ous fore casts were pro duced; in our study, they were 
already around 40 and had com pleted a much larger share of their child bear ing, thus 
mak ing the uncer tainty in our fore casts small. The dif fer ence between our results and 
pre vi ous fore casts is par tic u larly inter est ing in light of the recent eval u a tion of Bohk­
Ewald et al. (2018), who ana lyzed the fore cast ing per for mance of a large num ber of 
cohort fer til ity–fore cast ing meth ods. The approaches devel oped by Myrskylä et al. 
(2013) and Schmertmann et al. (2014) were among the top per form ers. Reuse of these 
meth ods now with data up to 2018 sug gests that the trends in cohort fer til ity are much 
less pos i tive than pre vi ously thought, high light ing the chal lenges of fore cast ing.
The Nor dic countries are fre quently cited in demo graphic the o ries pos it ing that 
the increas ing par tic i pa tion of men in fam ily life and stron ger insti tu tional sup port 
are crit i cal com po nents in efforts to pre vent fer til ity from fall ing to very low lev els 
in rich countries (Anderson and Kohler 2015; Esping­Andersen and Billari 2015; 
Goldscheider et al. 2015). There are no signs that gen der equal ity is declin ing or that 
fam ily pol i cies are weak en ing in the Nor dic countries (Rostgaard 2014; World Bank 
2012), which could, according to these the o ries, cause fer til ity to decline. During 
the recent decade, both Norway and Sweden have length ened the father’s quota and 
either short ened or abolished the cash­for­care pay ments (Duvander et al. 2019), 
although Norway expe ri enced a tem po rary set back in 2014 (Ruud 2015). In fact, 
these countries are witnessing a gen eral decline in fer til ity despite their favor able 
char ac ter is tics. It could be argued that Finland dif fers from the rest of the Nor dic 
countries because it does less than the other countries to pro mote work­fam ily rec­
on cil i a tion. For exam ple, in Finland, the pref er ence for home care allow ance is 
strong; the father’s quota was intro duced com par a tively late, and fathers’ uptake of 
paren tal leave is low; the rate of part­time employ ment is low; and no attempts to 
lengthen the father’s quota or to shorten the home care allow ance period in recent 
years­ have­ been­ suc­cess­ful.­ However,­ the­ declines­ observed­ in­ the­ other­Nor­dic­
countries require alter na tive expla na tions. Among these countries, Sweden has the 
lon­gest­and­most­flex­i­ble­paren­tal­leave­scheme,­Iceland­has­the­most­gen­der-equal­
paren tal leave scheme, and Norway has the lon gest paid paren tal leave earmarked 
for the father. In most Nor dic countries, fathers tend to take full advan tage of paren­
tal leave, and most chil dren are enrolled in daycare from an early age (Duvander 
et al. 2019). Beyond the poten tial case of Finland, the dif fer ences in fam ily pol i cies 
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or in gen der­equal ity mea sures across the Nor dic countries are not related to the 
strength of the recent fer til ity decline.
The mech a nisms that under lie the Nor dic fer til ity decline remain unclear, but existing 
evi­dence­points­in­direc­tions­beyond­the­influ­ence­of­fam­ily­pol­i­cies­or­gen­der­equal­ity­




til ity dif fer ences between countries are largely driven by var i a tion in the prob a bil ity of 
sec ond and third births (Frejka 2008; Zeman et al. 2018). This sug gests that var i a tion 
in­fam­ily­pol­i­cies­might­have­a­greater­impact­on­higher­birth­inten­si­ties­than­on­first­
births. Third, cohort ulti mate child less ness has increased most among lower­edu cated 
women (Jalovaara et al. 2021),­who­might­profit­less­from­pol­i­cies­that­help­to­rec­on­cile­
work and fam ily life. The reduc tion of oppor tu nity costs of child bear ing through the 
Nor dic fam ily pol i cies may be more impor tant for higher­edu cated women and cou­
ples than for those who are less­edu cated because the for mer attach more impor tance 
to the dual­earner model. The mech a nisms behind the Nor dic fer til ity decline appear 
to­be­dif­fer­ent­than­those­iden­ti­fied­in­other­Euro­pean­countries­because,­for­instance,­
very low fer til ity in Eastern Euro pean countries coex ists with high over all pro gres sion 
to­first­par­ity­(Zeman­et­al.­2018). Different pop u la tion sub groups in the Nor dic coun­
tries have expe ri enced rather sim i lar period fer til ity trends: fer til ity rates have decreased 
for­both­native­and­non­na­tive­women­ (Lundkvist­2020;­Official­Statistics­of­Finland­
[OSF] 2017; Statistics Denmark 2020; Tønnessen 2020) and across edu ca tional groups 
(Comolli et al. 2020),­yet­first-birth­rates­have­decreased­faster­among­lower-edu­cated­
women since 2014. Despite sub na tional regional dif fer ences in the lev els of fer til ity in 
Nor dic countries (Campisi et al. 2020), fer til ity has decreased in both urban and rural 
areas­(Hellstrand­et­al.­2019).
It is unclear how the Nor dic fer til ity decline is related to other poten tial expla na­
tions, such as changes in eco nomic uncer tainty, cul tural fac tors, or union for ma tion. 
Labor­mar­ket­sta­tus­has­become­a­cen­tral­deter­mi­nant­of­child­birth­ in­many­mod-
ern soci e ties (Matysiak and Vignoli 2008), and fer til ity trends tend to cor re late with 
eco nomic cycles (Andersson 2000; Schneider 2015; Sobotka et al. 2011). Although 
recent com par i sons of Nor dic countries have shown that fer til ity lev els dur ing and 
after the recent reces sion in 2008–2014 did not cor re late with the sever ity or dura­
tion of the eco nomic cri sis—Iceland was hit the hardest by the reces sion, followed 
by Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway—Comolli et al. (2020) suggested that 
the recent decline in period fer til ity could be attrib uted to the broader expe ri ence 
of increas ing labor mar ket inse cu rity. A detailed anal y sis from Norway high lighted 
not only the impor tance of women’s own labor mar ket sit u a tion for their fer til ity 
but also the eco nomic cir cum stances around them, with local unem ploy ment rates 
con­trib­ut­ing­to­a­decline­in­first­births­(Dommermuth­and­Lappegård­2017). Finland 
may also be in a spe cial posi tion regard ing eco nomic cir cum stances: the cohorts 
cur rently of child bear ing age sur vived the par tic u larly severe reces sion of the early 
1990s, and Finland cur rently stands out with a high share of 15­ to 29­year­olds 
not in employ ment, edu ca tion, or train ing (OECD 2020). Fixed­term employ ment 
is much more com mon in Finland and Sweden than in Denmark or Norway, espe­
cially among youn ger peo ple (Rasmussen et al. 2019),­and­fixed-term­employ­ment­
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has been shown to delay par ent hood (Sutela 2012). In future stud ies, more empha sis 
should­be­put­on­the­global­finan­cial­cri­sis­and­its­effect­on­youth­unem­ploy­ment­and­
sub jec tive expe ri ence of eco nomic secu rity. Recently, schol ars have advanced the 
nar ra tive frame work to assess the role of indi vid ual future pros pects of uncer tainty 
on fer til ity deci sions (Vignoli et al. 2020).
Cultural fac tors are also likely to explain var i a tion in fer til ity (Inglehart 1990; 
Surkyn­ and­ Lesthaeghe­ 2004), but their role in the cur rent fer til ity changes still 
remains ambig u ous. There are some indi ca tions that pref er ences regard ing fam ily 
life in Finland have only recently been chang ing: dur ing the last decade, the desired 
num ber of chil dren peo ple express to have has decreased, and in par tic u lar, the share 
who express 0 as their ideal num ber of chil dren has increased (Berg 2018; Rotkirch 
2020). Qualitative research from Finland empha sized that eco nomic and social uncer­
tainty and life style fac tors seem to shape young adult plans to have chil dren more 
strongly than before (Miettinen 2015; Rotkirch et al. 2017). Comparable research on 
such pref er ences is miss ing for the other Nor dic countries, although Dommermuth 
and­Lappegård­(2017) spec u lated that the gen eral trend in declin ing third births in 
Norway may indi cate that women increas ingly pre fer fewer chil dren. It is plau si ble 
that child less ness and hav ing fewer chil dren are becom ing increas ingly accepted in 
the Nor dic countries. Further, changes in partnering may explain part of the decline. 
For instance, in Finland, the major ity of the ulti mate child less men and women have 
never lived in long­term cores i den tial unions (Jalovaara and Fasang 2017), and the 
pro por tion liv ing alone has recently increased, espe cially among men (OSF 2018).
The period fer til ity decline that started in 2010 in the Nor dic countries has also 
been observed in other countries with rel a tively high fer til ity, such as France, Ireland, 
the­United­Kingdom,­and­the­United­States­(Human­Fertility­Database­2019). If the 
cohort fer til ity decline esti mated for the 1970s and 1980s cohorts in the Nor dic coun­
tries turns out to be part of a global trend, the Nor dic countries (although prob a bly not 
Finland) may remain at the top of the fer til ity league in Europe, albeit at lower lev els 
than before. Thus, it could be argued that cohort fer til ity would be even lower in the 
Nor dic countries in the absence of regional pol i cies that sup port work­fam ily rec on­
cil i a tion. Up­to­date fore casts for other high­income countries would put the Nor dic 
countries in per spec tive. Regarding the pos i tive asso ci a tion between gen der equal ity 
and fer til ity, many of the argu ments rest on observed and expected trends in period 
fer til ity, which are unsta ble and affected by changes in fer til ity tim ing. Refocusing 
on cohort fer til ity ques tions the plau si bil ity of a U­shaped fer til ity trend over time.
Our­find­ings­ indi­cate­ that­ the­com­mon­Nor­dic­ fer­til­ity­ regime­char­ac­ter­ized­by­
rel a tively high fer til ity is reshaping, with cohort fer til ity decreas ing because of a lack 
of fer til ity recu per a tion at older ages. More broadly, our results call into ques tion our 
under stand ing of the pat tern ing of fer til ity across high­income countries and illus trate 
that fer til ity declines can occur even in con texts favor ing work­fam ily rec on cil i a­
tion and high lev els of gen der equal ity. Consequently, more nuanced stud ies on the 
rela tion ship between gen der equal ity and fer til ity are required. Future com par a tive 
research that explores the links between eco nomic uncer tainty, the value placed on 
fam ily, and fer til ity rates could shed light on the causes of the recent fer til ity decline 
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